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Lawyers and Their Work is an important, useful, and challenging
book. It provides a wealth of material presented in a straightforward
way. While the authors interviewed 400 people, the respondents were
"informants" rather than a scientifically selected sample. These respon-
dents are important to the book, especially as examples, because a good
portion of it depends on their statements, but no claims are made that
the interviews are representative. The senior author, because of his
knowledge of the legal profession and his expertise in real property law,
is especially qualified in two of the significant areas covered in this
work. Together the authors have questioned the existing norms of the
bar associations, stirred up controversy, and asked for reconsideration
of legal practices in this country. This combination of pure information
and stimulating speculation should be of immense value to lawyers and
students of law who are seriously concerned with the legal profession.
ERwIN 0. SMIGELt
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS. By Archibald Cox,
Mark DeWolfe Howe, and J. R. Wiggins. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 76. $2.95.
This little book of seventy-six pages was in a sense an anachronism
even before its publication in 1967. The murder of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., on April 4th of this year may well have cast it upon the sea of
historical relics. Save for the paper by the late Mark DeWolfe Howe, the
book is little more than a view of what might have been.
In the opening paper, Professor Archibald Cox focuses his attention
on "Direct Action, Civil Disobedience and the Constitution." The ques-
tion Professor Cox seeks to answer is whether or not the activist wing of
the civil rights movement will lead us closer to justice for all. He notes
the existence today of a major block of people who believe that civil
disobedience of unjust laws is the only viable road to reform. In opposi-
tion to that position, he of feris what I would assume he considers a rhetor-
ical suggestion, that the widespread use of civil disobedience has under-
mined the charismatic foundation of American law.
At the outset Professor Cox seeks to define with a lawyer's particu-
larity the general terms "direct action," "civil disobedience," and "non-
violent action." Unfortunately, the definitions, as is so often the case, be-
come the argument. Immediately dismissed are what he considers to be
t Chairman, Department of Sociology, New York University.
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the polar aspects of civil disobedience. The first, the validity of the dis-
regard of the commands of civil authorities that clearly infringe a right
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, is accepted by Cox
without question. The second, which Professor Cox categorizes as
"direct action" which violates a "plainly valid" law, is viewed as imper-
missible. In the middle remains the area of debate and concern. Though
Professor Cox has made a substantial effort, it is plain that he, as others
before him, has woefully failed to clarify the middle.
There are few if any who would seriously disagree that the inten-
tional disobedience of a plainly unconstitutional law is intellectually and
philosophically commendable. Beyond that, however, the agreement or dis-
agreement with various forms of direct action necessarily depends upon
the viewpoint of the actor. When Professor Cox asserts that "one can say
categorically that there is no constitutional right of civil disobedience to
a valid law,"' one can in response say categorically that Professor Cox
has begged the question. The question, of course, is what is a "valid law"?
It is inferentially suggested that an answer to that question can be found
by drawing a dubious distinction between legal validity and moral
validity. As I read this paper, Professor Cox assumes that the intentional
disobedience of a law which one cannot seriously say is legally invalid must
be condemned. That may have been the issue in 1965 when the present
paper was given before the Massachusetts Historical Society. It dearly is
not the issue now. The focus of American young people today is upon
the moral validity of laws which affect them directly. The new morality,
about which Henry David Aiken has written so articulately,2 commands
obedience first to one's conscience and then to civil society. The plight of
the ghetto Negro and Spanish American and the plight of the white poor
and the American Indian, has touched the conscience of the young of this
nation, and they have made it plain to those of us who have passed the
golden age of thirty that they will bring this country to its knees before
they will join the Establishment on its terms.' The issue now is no longer
one of the rightness or morality of their action. Direct disobedience of
"valid laws" is an established continuing fact about which moralization
is an exercise in futility. The issue can be answered only upon the basis
of an a priori judgment about that morality. Such an answer, of course,
is not subject to meaningful debate-it depends by definition upon the
viewpoint of the believer.
The larger issue, and the one to which Professor Cox does not
1. A. Cox, M. HOWE & J. WIGGINS, Civi RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COURTS 10 (1967).
2. Aiken, The New Morals, Huwzp's, Feb. 1968, at 58.
3. See, e.g., Oglesby, A Program for Liberals, RAmPARTs, Feb. 1968, at 20.
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address himself, is the public-spirited lawyer's problem of preserving our
institutions in the face of open rebellion. Civil disobedience of Professor
Cox's "plainly valid law" is a sad but simple fact of life in 1968. The
issue to which lawyers must address themsleves is: what can and must be
done to preserve for all the benefits of an organized society?
The answer demonstrably lies in the word "communicatibn."
The young, middle-class, white drop-out who has rejected contemporary
society; the young, black militant; the migrant farmworker; and the
prosperous but concerned college student have something meaningful to
Gay. Their dissatisfaction and, I suspect, the basis of their "direct action"
lies in the fact that the "Establishment" will not listen to them. If one
reads Ramparts, the Village Voice, or any of the various "underground"
papers that have emerged throughout the country, it will become plain
that those journalistic endeavors are directed to the "true believer" alone
and proceed from the assumption that the "power structure" does not
listen and will not hear.
Black militants have in the last few years developed and espoused
the concept of "black awareness."4 Yet the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders has rejected the most basic tenets of that
proposition and has, as least for black people, continued to assert the
efficacy and moral validity of traditional welfare systems, integration,
and urban renewal.' But all one must do to discover the patent unwork-
ability of continuing "the system" while rejecting out of hand the new
proposals is to talk to the young leaders in the black ghettos of this
nation. One can there see that a substantial number of black people in
America no longer wish to be white. Natural haircuts, African clothing
and a concern with "black awareness" now permeate the ghetto and
demonstrate the attempt to legitimatize the black American. Those young
people no longer want to become a part of what is in their view a
morally bankrupt white society; rather they wish to develop black society,
economically, spiritually, and culturally and to do it on their terms. Until
we understand and, react realistically to the demands now being made
upon us, we cannot reasonably expect that violent civil disobedience will
end. Certainly, the concern with the morality of violence became painfully
academic in Watts; it remains academic today.
The more affluent, but equally disenchanted, white youth suffer
equally from a failure of communication. The hippies, the yippies, and the
Berkeley activists cannot be dismissed by America's elders as a passing
4. See J. BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); S. CARMICHAEL & C.
HAmILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1967); WRIGHT, BLACK
POWER AND URBAN UNREST (1967); Lasch, The Trouble with Black Power, N.Y. REv.
OF BooKs, Feb. 29, 1968, at 4.
5. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, Ch. 17.
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phenomenon. The movement of some of America's brightest young people
toward a total rejection of American society is not a fad, but is rather an
intensely ethical movement-an almost total rejection of the moral
foundation of the American middle class. A substantial number of young
people today exhibit no desire to own a color television set, an expensive
automobile, a fancy house in the suburbs, or any of the other status
impedimenta that have "made America what it is today." Instead, they
seek a moral justification for the economic amelioration of our culture
and find none. They have rejected the Calvinist ethic and substituted a
concept of love and brotherhood, decidely Christian and mystical in its
cast. They cannot be preached to but they can be listened to if someone
will listen and hear.
Professor Cox closes his paper with the following view:
[t]he hope of mankind is always that a new generation
may begin to make the world over quickly. The wrong, in the
simplest terms, is the damage to the foundation upon which
rests the best, if not the only, real opportunity for the making-
over.
6
Few would disagree with Professor Cox's observation. The problem lies
not in its intellectual validity but in its failure to recognize the existence
in today's society of an articulate and powerful group of young people
who would say to Professor Cox that the foundation he seeks to preserve
is not worth preserving if its moral underpinnings are not open to discus-
sion. The answer to that challenge lies in the establishment of a dialogue-
the opening of issues and the discussion of problems confronting the
young, sometimes affluent, but woefully unhappy youth of our society.
The second essay in the book, by the late Mark DeWolfe Howe,
touches upon the deeply historical roots of the violence and immorality
that are sweeping our country:
[t]he southerlies are still blowing. They have told us of
the killing of Medgar Evers, William Moore, James Reeb,
Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, Lemuel
Penn, Viola Liuzzo, and Jonathan Daniels. They brought us
the names of others, but those others we have forgotten because
they were merely four little children at church in Birmingham.
The breezes from the South have told us these ugly tales, but
they have not spoken of convictions of the guilty. They tell us,
instead, of murders, acquittals, mistrials, and local pride.7
6. A. Cox, M. Hoxw & J. WIGGINS, supra note 1, at 29.
7. Id. 31.
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With that invocation Professor Howe sets for himself the task of identi-
fying and illustrating the invalidity of "the concept which, above all
others, has served to incapacitate the nation's conscience."' To achieve
that goal Professor Howe delves with his customary finesse into the
depths of American legal history and in so doing demonstrates that
perhaps the only real discipline of our day is the study of history.
The history of the black man in America has been far from happy.
Our nation was born into a moral-legal dichotomy: the acceptance of the
legality of slavery and the rejection of its asserted morality. That
pluralism is demonstrated by the pronouncement of Lord Mansfield that
"the state of slavery . .. is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to
support it, but positive law."9 From that beginning, Professor Howe
traces the history of American constitutionalism as it has affected the
issue of slavery. The crux of his article is his discussion of the Recon-
struction legislation where he shows that the original legislation passed
by the Congress to protect the rights of black Americans was not limited
by the concept of "state action" which has so hindered and obsessed
American courts and scholars. Congress, Professor Howe asserts, "want-
ed to make sure that the institution and the badges of inferiority with
which it had degraded the Negro should be wholly eradicated."" To do
so it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, vetoed by President Andrew
Johnson and then passed over the veto.
The historical difficulty arises because the framers of the Recon-
struction legislation were cautious and conservative men. In order to
assure the constitutionality of the Equality Act of 1866, the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution was proposed. The result of that in-
discretion is now a well-known part our constitutional history. The
civil rights cases in 1883 forgot the thirteenth amendment background
of the Equality Act (which had in 1870 been transposed to the center of
a new civil rights act) and held that the prohibitions against discrimina-
tion therein contained were limited by the requirement of "state action."
As Professor Howe demonstrates beyond doubt that incorrect decision
has been the basis of the continuing polemic over the power of the
American Congress to regulate the affairs of private men engaged in
private discrimination and indeed private murder. The absurdity of that
proposition, however, does not deter the racial terrorists who seemingly
populate this nation in increasing numbers. Although the Supreme Court
has continually refused to face squarely the issue of state action, it is
8. Id.
9. Id. 32 (quoted from The Case of James Sommersett, 20 How. State Trials 2,
82 (1772)).
10. A. Cox, M. HowE & J. WIGGINS, opra note 1, at 47.
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indeed possible that it may do so this term in a case presently pending
before the Court." If it does reconsider the efficacy of the doctrine and
its application to the Civil Rights Act of 1870, it cannot ignore Professor
Howe's scholarship; acceptance of it would indeed be a fitting legacy to
one of America's great legal scholars.
So ends the little book, though there is in the last nineteen pages an
essay by one J. R. Wiggins entitled "The Press and the Courts." Mr.
Wiggins is a reporter and his essay is directed to the asserted right of a
newspaper to convey to the American public a picture of criminal justice.
The thrust of Mr. Wiggins' article, though it is indeed covered over with
a great many libertarian platitudes, is to be found in the following
paragraph:
[t]he plain truth of the matter is that the newspapers do
not print enough crime news; they do not follow closely enough
the conduct of the police, the operation of the courts, the
administration of penal institutions, the functioning of the pro-
bation system-or any other aspects of society's handling of
the whole enormous problem of crime. 2
Few would doubt the desirability of creating a public dialogue about our
penal system, but Mr. Wiggins is not content to stop there. He wants
increased news coverage at all steps of the criminal process and his
response to the publication of the Reardon Report indicates that concern:
[s] ince this paper was written the Reardon Committee of
the American Bar Association has issued its report, Fair Trial
and Free Press.
The recommendations of this committee, if carried into
effect, would diminish public scrutiny of the law enforcement
process. As James Bryce pointed out in 1893: "Democratic
theory, which has done a mischief in introducing the elective
system (for judges) partly cures it by the light of publicity
which makes honesty the safest policy." If this light of publicity
is shielded and obstructed enough fully to protect the accused
it will be darkened enough fully to protect corruption, mal-
practice, and fraud in the law-enforcement process.'3
At bottom, I suspect that Mr. Wiggins is only advocating the now
timeworn assertion that the right of a newspaper to make a trial public
is constitutionally protected. I would view the matter as cutting the other
11. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 23-39, Jones v. Meyer, 379 F.2d 33
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 645).
12. A Cox, M. HowE & J. WIGGINS, supra note 1, at 57.
13. A. Cox, M. HoxwN & J. WIGGINS, .upra note 1, at 76 n.9.
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way and protecting the right of the defendant to have, or prevent, a
public trial as he sees fit. It seems somehow incongruous to assert that
the right to a public trial cannot be waived by an intelligent and informed
citizen. That, in sum, is the implication of Mr. Wiggins' paper.
This book is, as I noted above, a book about what might have been.
In the sadness of this April, however, it can be read by men of good will
and concern and found to be thought-provoking but terribly sad. It is a
lawyer's book written for laymen and deserves to be a part of every
library.
WINTON D. WooDs JR.t
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
